From Bounded Rationality to Behavioral Economics by Egidi, Massimo
 1 
 
From Bounded Rationality to Behavioral Economics 
 
 
Massimo Egidi 
 
CEEL - University of Trento 
 
 
 
1 Rational choice and psychology of choice: an unresolved dualism 
 
“Modern mainstream economic theory is largely based on an unrealistic picture of 
human decision making. Economic agents are portrayed as fully rational Bayesian 
maximizers of subjective utility.  
This view of economics is not based on empirical evidence, but rather on the 
simultaneous axiomization of utility and subjective probability. In the fundamental book of 
Savage the axioms are consistency requirements on actions with actions defined as 
mappings from states of the world to consequences (Savage 1954). One can only admire 
the imposing structure built by Savage. It has a strong intellectual appeal as a concept of 
ideal rationality. However, it is wrong to assume that human beings conform to this ideal. 
“(Reihnardt Selten, 1999) 
 
The trenchant opinion expressed by Reinhardt Selten reflects the present rapidly evolving debate on 
decision making theory and the parallel emergence of a new approach: Behavioral Economics, a 
growing disciplinary area at the crossroads between economics and psychology which is challenging 
both the epistemological assumptions of neoclassical economics and the foundations of decision 
making theory. 
The challenge against the theory of rational behavior began at the height of its success and culminated 
with the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morghenstern 
in 1944. The first experimental results questioning the validity of the standard model of rational action 
date from the 1950s: Allais's experiments of 1952 and the empirical study of decision processes in 
firms conducted by Cyert, Simon and Trow in 1956. 
To understand the origins of current changes, therefore, we must return to the 'golden age' of standard 
rationality theory: the 1950s. The success achieved by linear and dynamic programming in those years 
seemingly justified unlimited faith in the ability of optimization models to explain all economically 
significant forms of behavior. There was a widespread conviction that it was invariably possible and 
justifiable to reduce macrophenomena to rational forms of behavior and to represent rational forms of 
behavior as problems of constrained maximization. 
   Yet, as the model of rational decision-making became increasingly well-defined, so there was a 
corresponding extension of its domain of application; an extension which led to a growth of 
computational complexity and to advancements in the creation of new, sophisticated optimization 
algorithms.  
This raised the problem of whether it was legitimate to ascribe individuals with the ability to perform 
extremely complex decision-making processes, resolving the problems connected with them by means 
of highly time-consuming and sophisticated algorithms, or whether models of rational behavior should 
only be interpreted in a normative sense as techniques aiding decision-making and suitable for use by 
experts, not by common decision-makers. 
It was this dilemma that prompted Simon to advance his hypothesis of bounded rationality and to 
dispute the idea of perfect and all-encompassing rationality. 
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2 The separation between psychology and economics. 
 
However, in those years a different solution of the dilemma was proposed by Milton Friedman, a 
solution that was highly successful and provided a (fallacious) point of reference for mainstream 
theory. 
   According to Friedman, although individuals do not possess the formal tools with which to calculate 
the optimum adequately, they behave as if they do - like bicycle riders who keep themselves in 
dynamic equilibrium even though they are unaware of the complex equations of the dynamics of 
motion, or billiard players who accomplish complex trajectories with their billiard balls although 
ignorant of the laws of rational mechanics. Friedman expressed skepticism about the possibility of 
discovering how business decisions are made through observation of behaviors, suggesting that 
individuals might actually be not aware of the mental processes involved in their actions. This 
observation was related to the idea that a part of relevant knowledge may be tacit, and it led Friedman 
to the extreme of prescribing that the individual expression of preferences must be disregarded. 
 A reasonable observation therefore became the unreasonable prescription of the Chicago school: the 
'as if' hypothesis was then supplemented with the further assertion that individual preferences are not 
observable, and indeed that they are irrelevant to proving the validity of an economic theory (Friedman 
1953). 
 
 
In order to explain why this position enjoyed such prolonged success, even though it was substantially 
misleading, we must examine the terms of the problem more carefully. In its standard version, the 
theory of rationality rests on the following conception of human behavior: there exists a set of 
conceivable actions that every individual may undertake and that give rise to certain consequences. 
Individuals possess a mental order of preferences concerning all the possible consequences of their 
actions. They evaluate these consequences, and, given the constraints, decide upon a particular action. 
They therefore make their choice coherently with their preferences and with the constraints upon them. 
This manner of proceeding is called rational ‘calculation’. 
 According to these assumptions, the theory of rational choice indicates to economic actors how best 
they can achieve their goals, and it is implicitly assumed (explicitly by Milton Friedman) that those 
who fail to conform are gradually excluded by a process of selection which permits only ‘rational’ 
operators to survive.  
On this view it is therefore both pointless and uninteresting to investigate the psychological aspects of 
decision-making, because at most these could only aid explanation as to why certain individuals are 
unable to behave in an entirely rational manner. 
 
   The normative approach to decision-making theory was limpidly expounded in Lionel Robbins’ 
Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economics (1932), in which he defined economics as the 
science of choice. In this approach, ‘calculation’ is therefore totally independent from individual mental 
activities, and it takes place irrespectively of the mental processes of single individuals. The role of 
rational decision making theory is viewed as being fundamentally normative; a view shared by the vast 
majority of economists for just under a century on the assumptions and the definitions provided by 
Robbins.  
Robbins codified a ‘post-Austrian’ view in which economics and psychology are fully autonomous 
specializations with independent scientific statutes. As pointed out by Schumpeter in his “History of 
Economic Analysis”, the separation of economics from psychology came about only after many 
decades of heated debate: 
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 “In principle, utility, be it total or marginal, was considered a psychic 
reality, a sensation that became evident from introspection, independent of 
any external observation […] with directly measurable proportions. I 
believe this was Menger and Böhm-Bawerk’s opinion” (Schumpeter, 
History of Economic Analysis).  
 
From the outset, recourse to a psychological interpretation of ‘utility’ was evident:  
 
“Ferdinando Galiani (Della moneta, 1750) defined utilità  as ‘the power 
of a thing to procure us felicity.’ Similarly, Jeremy Bentham at first spoke 
of utility as ‘that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce 
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness’ (An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1780). But the meaning of the term 
has shifted continuously and even today ‘utility’ circulates with various, 
albeit cognate, connotations. By referring to the principle of utility as the 
principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Bentham himself 
paved the way for this terminological license. The ensuing confusion 
prompted W. Stanley Jevons to insist that ‘Utility is not an Intrinsic 
Quality,’ but  ‘the sum of the pleasure created and the pain prevented’ (The 
Theory of Political Economy, 1871).” (N. Georgescu Roegen, Dictionary of 
the history of economic ideas) 
 
The introduction of utility as a psychological characteristic connected with the ‘value’ of human 
activities raised the question of how to measure the increasing or decreasing utility stemming from a 
particular choice. Such measurement did not appeared feasible to most economists. But then Pareto 
furnished proof that it was not necessary to resort to the utility function; rather, the ‘new theory of 
value’ could be grounded on the simpler notion of preference. The winning analytical strategy 
consisted in establishing some simple properties of preference orderings  – completeness, transitivity, 
continuity and independence – which enabled the construction of an axiomatic model of choice. It was 
mainly the controversy between the French and Austrian schools that fuelled the long evolution of the 
notion of utility until it eventually culminated in the version codified by Robbins, Hicks and Allen. 
Proof was gradually emerging that it was possible to adopt a utility function which was perfectly 
equivalent to the axiomatic model. The 1950s saw a series of disputes and much confusion with regard 
to this issue, as illustrated by Schumpeter in his History of Economic Analysis. (1968). By that time, 
however, Pareto’s approach had gained general consensus, and most economists shared the opinion that 
the theory 
 
 “…. has a much better claim to being called a logic of choice than a 
psychology of value” ( Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis).  
 
 
In the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944, von Neumann and Morghenstern 
took a further step forward. They set out an axiomatic approach to the theory of decision making in 
conditions of uncertainty, by formalizing the Expected Utility hypothesis two centuries after 
Bernoulli’s original definition of it. Though apparently innocuous, the assumption that in conditions of 
uncertainty individuals decide on the basis of expected utility contained restrictions in addition to those 
relating to the utility function under deterministic conditions, as noted by Allais (1979).   
 
Debate on the notion of Expected Utility ensued and lasted for over a decade. It encompassed a number 
of controversies connected with the confusion generated by the epistemology of the Chicago school. In 
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1952, Friedman and Savage published their famous study on expected utility in which they constructed 
an expected utility curve  which, they claimed, provided a reasonably accurate representation of 
observable behavior at the aggregate level.  
As said, Friedman and Savage’s approach considered the individual’s expression of preferences to be 
irrelevant. Consequently, their method did not suggest empirical control for individual preferences: on 
the contrary, it imposed a priori restrictions on the expected utility function based on characteristics 
relating to the behavior of large aggregates of individuals: for instance, the fact that numerous middle-
to-low-income citizens are ready to risk small sums of money on gambling implies that they are risk 
takers; analogously, the fact that those same citizens take out insurance means they are risk averse. The 
former property requires a convex utility function, while the latter requires concavity.  In order to 
account for both these features of the population’s behavior, Friedman and Savage suggested that the 
(aggregate) Expected Utility curve must have an ‘S’ shape for middle-to-low income values. Yet 
Friedman constructed a general shape for the curve without testing the characteristics on a real 
population: in fact, neither he considered empirical data on insurance, nor he made reference to reliable 
data on gamblers’ incomes , that did not even exist at the time.  
Friedman and Savage’s study seemed to be a considerable theoretical achievement in regard to 
definition of the notion of utility. Yet this advance was based on an untenable general epistemological 
approach that was unfortunately successful and for long remained an unquestioned dogma for a vast 
number of economists.  
As we will see in the next sections, both the ‘as if’ assumption and the methodological prescriptions on 
how to connect axiomatic decision theory with empirical data were successfully challenged by the new 
approach that emerged with Simon’s and Allais’s criticisms. 
 
3 Maurice Allais’s falsificationist approach to axiomatic decision theory 
 
Maurice Allais’s research pointed to conclusions the reverse of those obtained by Friedman and 
Savage’s approach. He carried out experiments on individual preferences - using an ingenious 
falsificationist method - that showed systematic failures in the theory’s predictions. In 1952, at a 
symposium held in Paris, Allais presented two studies in which he criticized the descriptive and 
predictive power of the ‘American School’s’ choice theory, and especially Friedman’s version of it 
(Allais, 1953). He submitted experiments in which subjects faced with alternative choices in conditions 
of risk systematically violate the assumptions of the Expected Utility theory. 
His investigation methodology overturned the prescriptions imposed by the Chicago school because it 
was founded on observation of an individual’s behavior and introduced an experimental method 
whereby the inherent difficulty of direct observation of individual preferences could be overcome by 
cross checking alternative choices.  
The experiments proposed by Allais had the following two distinctive features.  
First, the properties of the choice that characterize the expected utility function must be identified in 
axiomatic form; these properties are: completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence.  
Second, subjects are presented with pairs of binary choices selected in such a way that one combination 
of the answers involves the violation of at least one of the axioms.  
On this ground Allais showed that a large part of the subjects exposed to binary choices violated some 
axiom of the expected utility. An outline of one of the best known experiments follows.  
 
 
Do you prefer Situation A to Situation B? 
 
Situation A  
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Certainty of receiving 100 million (Francs) 
Situation B: 
 A 10% chance of winning 500 million, an 89% chance of winning 100 million, a 1% chance of 
winning nothing 
 
 
Do you prefer Situation C to Situation D? 
 
Situation C 
An 11% chance of winning 100 million, an 89% chance of winning nothing, 
Situation D: 
 A 10% chance of winning 500 million, a 90% chance of winning nothing 
 
 
Note that if Savage’s postulate is correct, the preference AB (“AB” means “A preferred to B” ) 
should entail C  D.1 But the experiment contradicts this prediction: 
 
“What one finds, however, is that the pattern for most highly prudent 
persons, the curvature of whose satisfaction curves is not very marked, and 
of who are considered generally as rational, is the pairing A  B and CD. 
This contradicts the Savage’s fifth axiom.” (Allais, 1952) 
 
 
Violations like the one just shown could be interpreted as signalling inconsistency in the system of 
individuals’ preferences. A natural reaction to the discovery of these violations is to suppose that 
inconsistencies are not systematic; and it was perhaps for this reason that the initial reaction to Allais’s 
experiment results was lukewarm. Many believed that his example was an extreme case, not a 
systematic one, in view of the particularly large sums at stake. Only later, after repeated experiments by 
Allais with actual modest sums being given to players, did the phenomenon emerge once again and 
thus had to be recognized as being systematic in character. (Camerer, 1995 ) 
Since experiments showed a violation of the expected utility theory axioms, it was only natural to 
suspect that this violation depended on overly stringent characteristics imposed on the definition of the 
expected utility function.2 Reaction to Allais’s experiments led in fact to the proposal of more 
sophisticated versions of the utility theory in conditions of uncertainty which modified or moderated 
certain axioms, or generalized their characteristics.  
As we shall see, this approach did not prove successful; rather, it confined the expected utility problem 
to a very specialized sector and limited its impact on microeconomics. In any case, in scientific circles, 
both in the area of probability theory and in the field of economic theory of choice, the scope of Allais 
work was not appropriately valued. Arrow justifies this underestimation by saying that if his study had 
been published by some of the most important American journals, future developments would have 
been achieved thirty years earlier. But this did not happen.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Proof:   If A  B, then U(100)>0.10U(500)+0.89U(100)+0.01U(0).  
Rearranging this expression gives 0.11 U(100)> 0.10U(500)+0.01U(0); and adding 0.89 U(0) to each side yields 
 0.11 U(100)+ 0.89 U(0) > 0.10U(500)+0.90U(0). Which means  CD. 
2 A similar reaction was provoked by the Ellsberg paradox.   
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4  A parallel criticism: Simon’ Bounded Rationality 
 
In the same period, the decision making model was about to be seriously questioned from another 
viewpoint and a different context: that of administrative and managerial behavior, which had hitherto 
entirely defied rationality analysis, despite the fact that rational planning analysis within organizations 
was highly developed. The success attained by optimisation methods brought out two critical aspects: 
on the one hand the extreme sophistication of many optimisation models made it impossible for them to 
be applied in most organizations; on the other, it was becoming clear that the amount of calculation 
needed to obtain an optimal solution could in some cases be insurmountably high. It was within this 
context, and in light of empirical observations on how organizations function, that the limits to the 
individual ability to make rational calculations became evident. 
 The theory of bounded rationality can be traced back to Herbert Simon’s work at Carnegie Mellon 
with Dick Cyert, Jim March and Harold Guetzkow at the beginning of the 1950s. Their research 
programme dealt with realistic issues of economic organizations in a period when the conceptual 
apparatus available was entirely inadequate to the purpose.   
The group examined methods for the control of decisional processes within companies. It did so from 
within the selfsame companies analysed and was thus able to conduct in-the-field appraisal of the 
behavior of managers and employees. The radical revision of the two notions of rationality and 
organization that characterizes Simon’s theory, compared with the neoclassical tradition, originated 
from the extraordinary interaction of this group. In Models of my Life (1991) Simon recalls that the 
group gradually altered the language of discussion by introducing “semantic changes” which shed new 
light on the themes discussed: the notions of bounded rationality, satisficing, problem solving  were 
thus developed in a context of highly  interdisciplinary analysis.  
The limitations of the theory available to the group at the time were evident:  the Weberian analysis of 
rationality and bureaucracy that had enjoyed such prolonged success revealed its shortcomings when 
applied to the behavior of managers founded on the ability to solve problems and innovate in ever-
changing situations. The traditional approach, as said, was centred on decision making as a choice; 
construction of the decision context was considered secondary, and so was the discovery of alternative 
strategies. The shift of attention was due in part to the effects of consumption theory, for in this theory 
consumption alternatives are assumed to be normally known by subjects; the only significant problem 
being the choice of the consumption plan that maximizes expected utility, bearing in mind the limits on 
the availability of funds.  
Matters change entirely, however, when the same scheme is applied to contexts of production and 
organization. In this case, decisions are taken in an environment where it is extremely difficult, and at 
times impossible, to evaluate all the available alternatives and their consequences. Exploration of this 
world reveals that the decision is nothing but a final act of a complex process that precedes it, and 
through which the relevant information is gathered and the appropriate knowledge is structured.  
By introducing the notion of bounded rationality, Simon picked up on both of these proprieties of the 
decision-making process. He argued that the real restriction on a rational decision was the need to 
construct the context of the decision. To do so individuals must search for all the relevant information 
and then construct a ‘mental model’ representing the decisional context.The difficulty of fully 
representing the latter and of organizing an appropriate mental representation of it marks out the 
bounds of rationality.  
Simon initiated a new research strategy in order to uncover the secrets of human cognition. He took up 
one of Turing’s central statements – if a problem can be clearly described with appropriate language, 
then it can be transferred into a form computable by a machine – and began to build artefacts of 
artificial intelligence. The artificial reproduction of certain aspects of human problem solving was a 
new strategy with which to understand the human mind; and the writing of computer programs that 
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made it possible opened the doors to ‘artificial intelligence’. Simon worked in parallel on giving strong 
impetus to the empirical analysis of cognitive processes. His starting point was analysis of the game of 
chess, which Simon explored extensively from a theoretical as well as experimental viewpoint. His 
examination provides a striking example of the complexity involved in constructing good, or 
‘satisficing’, strategies.  
The game of chess focused researchers’ attention on the question of complexity and on the limits of 
mental calculation. But Simon moved beyond the notion of calculation by first introducing the idea of 
‘symbolic manipulation’ and then directly considering the determinants of cognitive processes 
(reasoning, categorizing, chunking,…). Experiments applying ‘Protocol Analysis’ were carried out: 
verbal ideas expressed during the game by players were taken down and analyzed in order to 
understand the cognitive processes involved. 
 Problem solving emerged as one of the crucial aspects of the players’ mental activity. This analysis 
pioneered by Simon showed that players’ mental activity systematically violates rational choice: chess 
strategies are inter-temporal decisions which require players to elaborate and re-elaborate their 
analyses; their decisions are based on a process of learning and mental model building repeatedly at 
odds with perfect rationality.  
Moreover, by opening up the new field of artificial intelligence,  problem solving theory and the 
connected experiments using protocol analysis made it clear that, despite the great progress achieved, 
the limit of the ‘artificial’ imitation of the players’ mental activity was that it captured only the ‘explicit 
thinking’ (i.e. the deliberate mental processes) accessible through introspection.  
 
The 1960s were therefore the years of the greatest challenge against the axiomatic foundations of 
rational choice. On the one hand, Allais’s critique aroused renewed interest in psychology; on the other, 
Simon made clear that if human intelligence was to be thoroughly understood it had to be  
‘decomposed’ into its many complex processes and elements: induction, reasoning and problem 
solving were, in Simon’s view, the true protagonists in  comprehension of human bounded rationality, 
and consequently yielded a more realistic picture of economic and organizational phenomena. 
 
 
5 The 1980s: Revising the paradigm  
 
The most natural way out of the impasse created by Allais’s experiments was to consider the theory of 
expected utility as too restrictive, and therefore to seek an extended theory of expected utility. Many 
proposals were put forward, especially from the mid 1970s onwards, and all of them attempted to relax 
or slightly modify the original axioms of expected utility theory. The most widely cited of them were 
perhaps the Weighted Utility Theory (Chew and MacCrimmon), which assumed a weaker form of the 
independence axiom; the Regret Theory proposed by Loomes and Sugden (1982); and the 
Disappointment Theory propounded by Gul (1991). None of them had statistical confirmation over the 
full domain of applicability (Hey, 1991). 
Kahnemann and Tversky’s approach differed crucially from previous proposals in that it did more than 
modify certain axioms; rather, it restructured the problem by concentrating on the mental processes 
involved. The approach fit coherently within the analytical frame of Bounded Rationality, as the two 
authors explicitly acknowledged. 
In 1987, Tversky and Kahnemann moved beyond Allais’s experiments to show that when individuals 
take risky decisions, they exhibit a systematic inconsistency related to the framing of the decision. 
Tversky and Kahnemann ran the following experiment, which clearly elicited this effect: 
 
Problem 1 
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Assume you are 300 $ richer than you are today. Choose between  
-   A the certainty of earning 100$ 
-   B a 50% probability of winning 200$ and a 50% one of not winning anything 
 
Problem 2 
Assume you are 500 $ richer than today. Choose between 
-    C   A sure loss of 100$ 
-    D   a 50% chance of not losing anything and a 50% chance of losing 200$ 
 
Readers responding to the two problems will probably opt for the adverse risk option in problem 1, and 
therefore choose an earning that is assured (answer A). And this was the choice made by the vast 
majority of participants in the experiment. Instead, the answer preferred in problem 2 will probably be 
the one in favor of risk-taking, and therefore answer B.  
It was noted that the majority – who picked answers A and D – violated the theory of expected utility 
(the independence axiom of the theory), as in Allais’s experiments.  
Simple reflection shows that, in terms of expected utility, the two problems are the same problem; in 
fact, the entity’s available wealth was considered after the choice had been made:  
 
 
Problem 1  
 
Case A   400   with prob=1 
Case B           300   with prob=0.5     or   500  with prob=0.5 
 
Problem 2  
 
Case C   400   with prob=1 
Case D  300   with prob=0.5     or   500  with prob=0.5 
 
Therefore a large majority of individuals behave as risk takers when confronted by a problem presented 
in terms of loss (Problem 2) while they behave as risk averse when the same problem is presented in 
terms of gain (Problem 1). This behavioral inconsistency is called the ‘framing effect’ and demonstrates 
that the representation (framing) of a problem may be crucial in ‘ordering’ the preferences. 
Moreover, Tversky and Kahnemann observed that  
 
 “…. the path of preferences observed in the two problems are of particular interest 
as they violate not only the theory of expected utility, but practically all choice models 
based on other normative theories. It must be noted that these data are not consistent with 
the “Regret” model proposed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) and 
axiomatized by Fishburn (1982)” 
 
We again have confirmation that extended utility axiomatic theories – which  explain violations of the 
expected utility theory by introducing new axioms or reducing the original ones – cannot receive 
experimental confirmation in all spectrums of  experiments conducted to date. 
On the contrary, numerous experiments have confirmed the above-described framing effect.. 
Kahnemann and Tversky’s approach therefore appears to be the one that has attained the best 
experimental results, and it has had greater analytical potential. 
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Kahnemann and Tversky suggest that in order to understand a decision one must thoroughly analyze 
the cognitive processes that underlie it. It is thus necessary to examine how people represent problems; 
how the complex process of editing is carried out; and how mental models are built in order to make a 
particular decision. 
A suggestion closely related to Simon’s analysis of the decisional problem considers the decision to the 
final act in a problem-solving process. Problem-solving is the core of a subject’s activities in taking a 
decision, and it is described as a calculation made to find a (satisficing) strategy. This ‘calculation’ is 
carried out under strong restrictions imposed by the cognitive limitations of individuals and which may 
generate systematic biases: that is, systematic deviations from the results that would be obtained by a 
‘hyper rational’ subject, an omniscient calculator of unlimited power. 
The ‘guidelines for future researches’ emerging from the bounded rationality approach and from 
Kahnemann and Tversky’s results suggest that an explanation for biases and deviations from 
“Olympian” rationality should be sought by conducting deeper exploration of the cognitive processes 
lying behind decisions. This approach opens up a broad field of new experimental and theoretical 
analysis that will be briefly sketched later. Before these developments are considered, however, the last 
element of Friedman’s ‘as if’ approach – the evolutionary justification of rationality – should be dealt 
with. 
 
 
 
6 Lock-in: the persistence of many sub-optimal solutions in human problem solving  
 
Individuals and organizations may systematically deviate from perfectly rational strategies for both 
cognitive and emotional reasons. The cognitive explanation of the limits of rationality originates from 
the pioneering analysis of strategic situations conducted by Simon in the 1950s. In 1956, Cyert, Simon 
and Throw carried out an empirical study of managerial decisions which revealed an evident 'dualism' 
of behavior: on the one hand, there was behavior guided by a coherent choice among alternatives 
typical of structured and repetitive conditions; on the other, behavior characterised by highly uncertain 
and ill-defined conditions, where the predominant role was played by problem-solving activities.3  
 
"Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent to which the 
decision-making process is programmed. At one extreme we have repetitive, well-defined 
problems (e.g., quality control or production lot-size problems) involving tangible 
considerations, to which the economic models that call for finding the best among a set of 
pre-established alternatives can be applied rather literally. In contrast to these highly 
programmed and usually rather detailed decisions are problems of non-repetitive sort, 
often involving basic long-range questions about the whole strategy of the firm or some 
part if it, arising initially in a highly unstructured form and requiring a great deal of the 
kinds of search processes listed above." (1956, p.238) 
 
The core of the decision-making process is therefore the activity of searching. The conditions for 
application of standard choice theory are largely lacking because preference orderings are highly 
incomplete, decisions are simultaneously inconsistent, and choices are largely ineffective in relation to 
the goals pursued. The most important part of the process is driven by the ability of the subjects to 
formulate and solve new, unexpected and ill-defined problems.  
                                                 
3 In this last set of conditions, not only must subjects gather information, they must also be able to select the information and knowledge 
that is effectively relevant to their purposes and to assimilate it into the system of knowledge that they already possess. To do so, they 
must have a 'level of competence' adequate to the situation of their choice; they must, that is, implement skills of learning and problem 
solving. 
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The notion of bounded rationality therefore assumed increasing importance in field studies on team 
decisions under ill-defined conditions within organizations. These studies induced March and Simon to  
radically rethink the traditional idea of  ‘planning’. They turned the notion of planning, based on the 
notion of optimal intertemporal decision making, upside down and substituted it with the notion of 
‘organizational learning’, a process of collective problem solving which essentially involves the 
revision and correction of the procedures to accomplish goals. The most important feature of 
organizational problem solving is the ability of teams to revise their solutions and remedy the errors 
that they may have committed. This is the most revolutionary aspect of the recasting of the traditional 
view of organizational activities put forward in March and Simon’s celebrated book Organizations 
(1958). Here, the notion of organizational learning is expounded with clarity, and the description of 
organizational decisions is realistically rooted in the notion of organizational conflict; the conflicting 
views of individuals in the same organization are considered to be the  engine of the organizational 
learning.  A few years later, in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963) Cyert and March showed that 
organizational learning is a highly path-dependent process, and moreover that it is strongly biased by 
the constant emergence of erroneous beliefs and solutions. 
 
“….. when an organization discovers a solution to a problem by searching in a 
particular way, it will be more likely to search in that way in future problems of the same 
type; when an organization fails to find a solution by searching in a particular way, it will 
be less likely to search in that way in future problems of the same type. Thus, the order in 
which various alternative solutions to a problem are considered will change as the 
organization experiences success or failure with alternatives. 
In a similar fashion, the code (or language) for communicating information about 
alternatives and their consequences adapt to experience. Any decision-making system 
develops codes for communicating information about the environment. Such a code 
partitions all possible states of the world into a relatively small number of classes of states. 
Learning consists in changes in the partitioning. In general, we assume the gradual 
development of an efficient code in terms of the decision-making rules currently in use. 
 Thus, if a decision rule is designed to choose between two alternatives, the 
information code will tend to confine all possible states of the world into two classes. If 
the decision rules change, we assume a change in the information code, but only after a 
time lag reflecting the rate of learning. The short-run consequences of incompatibilities 
between the coding rules and the decision rules form some of the most interesting long-run 
dynamic features of an organizational decision-making model.” [Cyert and March, (1963) 
1992, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, p. 174] 
 
 
To some extent, the emergence of erroneous behaviors is taken to be a natural outcome of the 
‘imperfections’ and limits of human rationality. Throughout their analysis, March and Simon maintain 
that shortcomings and errors in organizational planning are embodied in the nature of  human decision 
making; a view which induces them on the one hand to explore the limits of individual rationality, and 
on the other to find evidence of organizational errors.  
 
 
6.1 The explanation of biases as resulting from constraints on search processes due to computational 
complexity 
 
In a series of papers now considered classics (1950-1979), Simon explored the decision making process 
from both the theoretical and experimental viewpoints. Taking the behavior of chess players as a 
benchmark for understanding the limits on the capacity of humans to discover strategies, he modelled a 
player’s search for a solution as exploration within the tree of alternatives: errors in this context are 
generated by the need to simplify the search by pruning most of the branches of the tree, so that the 
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number of game configurations requiring exploration can be drastically reduced. Players need to 
simplify the game’s strategic representation in order to dominate the problem mentally. ‘Simplifying’ 
the search by deleting large parts of the tree a priori generally leads to discovery of a non-optimal 
strategy. This strategy would lose against a perfectly rational opponent; but because perfect rationality 
is computationally  unachievable (the number of states to be explored to find the winning strategy 
exceeds the available memory of any human being), both players construct an imperfect, sub-optimal 
strategy, and both commit systematic errors. The winner is the player whose errors are less important 
than those of his opponent.     
In a more general context of problem solving under conditions of complexity, decomposition of 
problems into sub-problems is one of the heuristics most widely used by human beings to achieve a 
solution. The decomposition is recursively applied to each sub-problem until elementary and easily-
solved sub-problems are identified. The simplicity of an elementary sub-problem, may enable the 
player to discover the optimal strategy with ease. This is apparently the key to reducing the complexity 
of the original problem, and it is frequently used by problem solvers. Unfortunately, however, the 
discovery of all optimal solutions to the sub-problems does not yield the optimal global solution to the 
original problem. In fact, it is possible to show that the conditions under which the global solution 
(composed by the optimal sub-problems solutions) is optimal are very restrictive, and consequently 
most decompositions patterns lead to sub-optimal global solutions. (Egidi 2004) 
The origin of this unexpected property can be understood if we consider puzzle solving. Here, players 
must build a simplified representation of the game in order to discover a (boundedly rational) strategy. 
The optimal solution to puzzles consists in the shortest path from the starting configuration to the goal. 
Given the enormous number of game configurations that must be analyzed to get an optimal solution, 
in order to obtain a simple representation of the solution, players classify the states of the puzzle into a 
relatively small number of categories: large sets of game configurations are therefore aggregated into 
few categories. These categories are the result of a process of abstraction and classification based on 
the salience of symbolic features of the configurations of the game.  
In the case of Rubik’s cube, for example, the arrangement of the colours of the tiles along one, two or 
more corners are salient elements with which to categorize classes of configurations that are supposed 
to come progressively closer to the final configuration. These categories allow the identification of sub-
goals into which the original puzzle is decomposed. For example, one of the most popular strategies for 
solving the cube is based on a procedure by which players as a first step must form a cross on the top of 
the Rubik's Cube so that the colors of the edge cubes match the colors of the center cubes. To make the 
cross players must sequentially move a first corner, the central tile on the top face, the other three 
corners facing the same top face, into the right positions. 
Each sequential position of the corners is mentally represented as a ‘class of configurations’ because it 
is defined by the positions of a limited number of tiles, while the positions of all the other tiles are 
irrelevant. 
In other words, players consider classes of configurations as elementary building blocks during the 
search for a strategy. By discovering a procedure, they keep in mind a sequence of actions that connect 
classes of configurations together, assuming an order among them. Consequently, by simplifying the 
representation of the game through categorization, players build up an ‘aggregated game’ in which the 
configurations are aggregated states. They must conjecture the distance from the states to the target: 
that is, they must conjecturally order the categories in relation to their distances to the final goal. 
Frequently, however, the order that players conjecture does not hold for all elements of the categories: 
for example, when solving the Rubik’s cube puzzle, players may ‘naturally’ believe that the class of 
configurations ‘four corners in the right place’ is closer to the goal than the class of configurations 
‘three corners in the right place’, but this is not necessarily true for all elements of these two categories.  
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Players thus produce relatively simple and abstract representations of the strategy by categorization, but 
their evaluation of the order among the categories may be inaccurate. Owing to this distortion, the 
players do not always approach the goal along the shortest path; on the contrary, at least for some 
configurations, they achieve the goal by following a tortuous path that, in some steps, gets further away 
from the goal.  
The most intriguing aspect of this situation is that, while the paths to the goal generated by a single 
procedure are optimal for some of the elements (the ‘right’ ones) but not for all of them, when players 
solve the puzzle for the ‘right’ elements, the optimality of their decisions will be confirmed. They 
consequently cannot easily perceive that they have made a wrong classification and modify their 
decomposition pattern accordingly.  
It is evident that there are different categorizations and decomposition patterns to each problem. Some 
of them maintain the features of the original problem, but the vast majority do not and this generates 
decision biases. The set of all different decomposition patterns may be represented in a ‘landscape’ 
with different levels of ‘fitness’, i.e. with different degrees of sub-optimality (see section 7). In other 
words, when a player constructs one simplified representation of the problem by identifying some basic 
categories with which to describe the game, he discovers one point in the landscape. To move to a 
different point, i.e. to discover a different representation of the problem, the player must re-define some 
of the categories, or some relations among them. Learning a new game strategy is a process of 
redefining categories, and it is consequently a cognitively effortful process. This explains why it is so 
difficult to discover more efficient strategies of a game, and why players may remain locked into a sub-
optimal strategy.  
Experiments in puzzle solving (Egidi 2004) confirm the stability of sub-optimal representations, giving 
further support for Cyert and March’s original explanation of biases in organizational behaviors. 
 
6.2 The mechanization of thought  
 
So far, we have seen that experimental data on puzzle solving show that, once most individuals have 
identified a strategy, they are likely to remain anchored to it even though it is not optimal. The first 
experiment in this domain dates back as far as 1942, when Luchins (1942) and Luchins and Luchins 
(1950) ran experiments with subjects exposed to mathematical problems for which there were different 
solutions with different levels of efficiency. The authors showed that when subjects had identified the 
optimal solution for a problem in a given context, they ‘automatically’ and systematically transferred it 
to a different context where it was sub-optimal.  This process was called ‘mechanization of thought’.  
Experiments with Target the Two (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994, Egidi and Narduzzo 1997) confirm that 
a similar process is involved in behavior by a team, and in an even more evident and persistent manner: 
groups of subjects jointly engaged in solving a shared problem may remain even more stably ‘trapped’ 
in sub-optimal solutions than single individuals.  In fact, whilst difficulties encountered by a single 
subject when solving a problem in a new way depend on whether a new solution can be discovered, 
and are influenced by cognitive limitations on individual learning, this is all the more the case of a 
group, because it must find new ways to cooperate in problem solving by devising and adopting an 
alternative solution jointly. 
 
7 The evolutionary justification of rationality  
 
Even though the most influential evolutionary approach to justifying rationality is  Friedman’s, the 
evolutionary justification was put forward by many important authors before and after Friedman did so.  
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The approach was first formulated by Alfred Marshall, who in articles published in the 1870s sketched 
a model of the mind and used it to describe the processes by which routines arise, and the mechanism 
of innovation and creativity within organizations (Rizzello,2003). 
However, although Marshall’s evolutionary view attracted many admirers among economists, it 
remained as a pure methaphor for half a century until the emergence, in the late 1930s, of debate on the 
realism of marginalist principles.  
The debate arose after several authors – among them the Oxford Research Group – had argued that the 
empirical evidence did not show that entrepreneurs followed the marginalist principles of profit-
maximization/cost-minimization in running their firms. (Hall and Hitch, 1939) 
Harrod (1939) responded to these criticisms by claiming that profit-maximization was not observed in 
many firms partly because the information – marginal revenue and costs – necessary for such 
calculations was hard to obtain. But, he added, the ‘best’ decisions would nonetheless arise from a 
process of ‘natural selection’.  
 
"New business procedures would then be analogous to new mutations in nature. Of 
a number of procedures, none of which can be shown either at the time or subsequently to 
be truly rational, some may supplant others because they do in fact lead to better results. 
Thus while they may have originated by accident, it would not be by accident that they are 
still used. For this reason, if an economist finds a procedure widely established in fact, he 
ought to regard it with more respect than he would be inclined to give in the light of his 
own analytic method." 
(Roy F.Harrod, 1939, Oxford EP)   
 
Fritz Machlup (1946, 1947) and George J. Stigler (1946) joined the debate to defend the marginalist 
principle. But the best-known evolutionary view was put forward by Armen Alchian (1950, 1953), who 
argued that the neoclassical theory of the firm was not about firms as such but industries. Individual 
firms, Alchian maintained, essentially followed routinized procedures (as  Harrod claimed), but it was 
the industry which adhered to the marginalist principles.  
The first important breakthrough in the evolutionary approach was achieved by Nelson and Winter, 
who deepened the distinction between routinized and innovative behaviors and argued that the 
evolution of organizations does not necessarily lead them to optimality (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
Winter, 1975, 2005). 
In similar vein S. Kauffmann showed with his NK model (1989) that evolution by mutations may 
produce sub-optimal configurations in which a system may stay locked. His basic idea was that 
evolution is a process of collective problem-solving undertaken by organisms in their environment: the 
evolution of an organism, or in general of a complex biological system, is guided by its ‘fitness’, that 
is, by its reproductive success in the environment. The characteristics that determine the fitness of an 
organism can be represented in a discrete space because they are a set of ‘traits’ that can assume 
different values. 
In Kauffman’s original approach ‘traits’ can be proteins or genes, each of which can assume different 
‘configurations’ or ‘values’ (alleles). An organism is characterized by N traits, each of which assumes a 
given value. A mutation is nothing other than a change in the value of a trait (allele). Consequently, to 
explore the effect of single mutations on the organism fitness we must change the values of the traits 
one at the time. A crucial property of the traits is 'epistasis': when a mutation is introduced, it normally 
happens that the effect on the organism’s fitness depends on the values of other traits.  
Call K the average number of genes that contribute to the fitness variation of the organism when a 
mutation occurs, i.e. the average number of epistatic interactions. K may vary from K=0 (total 
independence) to K=N-1 (total interdependence). In the former case, (K=0) the effect of a mutation on 
the fitness depends solely upon the single gene that is affected by the mutation; therefore by comparing 
the different effects of different mutations on the same gene, we can discover the allele that produces 
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the higher increase in the fitness.  If we sequentially make the same comparison on all the genes, we 
can discover for every gene the alleles that make the best contribution to the fitness. We can thus 
increase the fitness of the organism until its maximum value by acting on each gene independently. 
This means that an organism with zero epistatic interactions may achieve an optimal configuration in 
response to a sequence of random mutations. 
 
“The assumption that each gene contributes to overall fitness independently of all 
other genes is clearly an idealization. In a genetic system with N genes, the fitness 
contribution of one or another allele of one gene may often depend upon the alleles of 
some of the remaining N-1 genes. Such dependencies are called epistatic interactions 
“(Kauffman, 1989, p. 539). 
 
Kauffman shows that as the epistatic interaction grows, the number of local optima increase, and an 
organism affected by mutations may remain trapped once it has reached a local optimum.  
Again we have an explanation of why complex systems, which can metaphorically represent individual 
or organizations, may remain trapped in sub-optimal configurations (see also Franken et al., 1999). 
 Kauffman’s model provides important support for Nelson and Winter’s views in the field of the 
evolutionary approach to organizations. When discussing the limits of competition, they emphasize that 
market mechanisms may not be able to select the best organizational structures and, again, that 
inefficient firms may survive in the long run. 
In a similar intellectual context Levinthal and March (1993) single out a number of  ‘myopias’ and 
‘traps’ into which an organization may fall during the process of organizational learning. The two 
authors show, for example, that an organization tends to give priority to the short-term perspective over 
the long-term one (‘temporal myopia’), and, because of this myopia, the long-period survival of the 
organization may be jeopardized. The temporal myopia trap has also been reported by research in the 
psychology of individual decision-making. In this area, the trap is most evident in the tendency of 
individuals to prefer small and immediate benefits over more substantial benefits that will accrue in the 
future. It is also manifest in the tendency of individuals to avoid small, immediate losses or sacrifices, 
preferring greater losses more distant in time. Therefore, we have both empirical evidence and formal 
models to show that individuals or organizations may remain trapped in sub-optimal strategies despite 
the working of competitive mechanisms.  
This suggests that the idea (Friedmann’s) that rational behavior arises through selection due to 
evolution is a metaphor with a limited range of application. Moreover, the large body of evidence on 
violations of the axioms of expected utility theory induces the charge of inconsistency against the 
methodological approach of Chicago school, as in the following harsh evaluation by Sidney Winter: 
 
It does seem clear to me that the idea of ‘as if’ maximization, along with its 
associated constellation of highly skeptical attitudes regarding the value of direct 
observation, is basically a defensive maneuver that serves to protect a seriously flawed 
theory. (Winter, 2005, p.9) 
  
 
 
8. Decomposing Rationality and opening the Pandora Vase of human intelligence 
 
A relevant  (and only partially explored) aspect of cognitive traps is their ‘stability’: in many contexts, 
errors and violations of rationality are systematic and persistent. A number of experiments (Camerer 
2004, Tversky 1977) show, in fact, that when subjects are made aware of biases connected to their 
choices, they only minimally adjust their behavior.  
Tversky 1977 comments on these findings thus:  
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 “…Daniel Kahneman and I have studied the cognitive processes underlying the 
formation of preference and belief. Our research has shown that subjective judgments 
generally do not obey the basic normative principles of decision theory. Instead, human 
judgments appear to follow certain principles that sometimes lead to reasonable answers 
and sometimes to severe and systematic errors. Moreover, our research shows (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) that the axioms of rational choice 
are often violated consistently by sophisticated as well as naive respondents, and that the 
violations are often large and highly persistent. In fact, some of the observed biases, such 
as the gambler’s fallacy and the regression fallacy, are reminiscent of perceptual illusions. 
In both cases, one’s original erroneous response does not lose its appeal even after one has 
learned the correct answer.” 
 
 
We have thus far reviewed the explanation of biases and errors in puzzles and games playing based on 
incomplete representation of the problems, i.e. on purely cognitive features of human behavior, and 
examined the available evidence. 
As we have seen, Luchins and Luchins show that when subjects have identified the optimal solution of 
a task in a given context, they automatically transfer it to contexts where it is sub-optimal.  Luchins and 
Luchins’s experiments demonstrate that, once a mental computation deliberately performed to solve a 
given problem has been repeatedly applied to solve analogous problems, it may become routinized. Its 
routinized use enables individuals to pass from deliberate effortful mental activity to partially 
automatic, unconscious and effortless mental operations.  
This routinization of thinking is the emergent part of a more complex and general question: to what 
extent are our actions the effect of a deliberate mental computing activity, and conversely, to what 
extent is such mental activity accessible through introspection? This was a core question addressed by 
Kahneman’s Nobel Lecture (2002), where he distinguishes (see Figure 1) two modes of thinking and 
deciding: what he calls intuition and reasoning. Kahneman notes that there is considerable agreement 
among psychologists on the characteristics that distinguish these two cognitive processes. Following 
Stanovich and West (2000), he calls them respectively System 1 and System 2. 
 
“The operations of System 1 are fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and 
difficult to control or modify. The operations of System 2 are slower, serial, effortful, and 
deliberately controlled; they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule-governed. As 
indicated in Figure 1, the operating characteristics of System 1 are similar to the features 
of perceptual processes. On the other hand, as Figure 1 also shows, the operations of 
System 1, like those of System 2, are not restricted to the processing of current stimulation. 
Intuitive judgments deal with concepts as well as with percepts, and can be evoked by 
language.” 
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Figure 1 -   Kahneman’s description of cognitive processes 
 
The distinction between System1 and System2 was first drawn by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977), who 
called them respectively ‘automatic’ and ‘controlled’ processes; since then many analogous two-system 
models have been developed under different names, as discussed by Camerer (Camerer et al., 2004) 
The question raised by Luchins and Luchins fully matches this distinction because it shows how a 
process of reasoning – typically composed of slow, serial and effortful mental operations – comes to be 
substituted by an effortless process of automatic thinking.  
Of course, understanding the inverse process is matter of equal importance: the question is how it 
happens that automatic mental activities are accessible to conscious thinking, and to what extent they 
may be used in deliberate cognitive activities. While some aspects of these questions being clarified by 
neurophysiology, and particularly by using brain imaging techniques, traditional psychological 
experiments, too, have furnished a great deal of important information. 
The crucial element in understanding how automatic processes interact with deliberate mental 
processes is ‘accessibility’. Accessibility is a continuum, not a dichotomy: experimental evidence 
shows that the more a person acquires information and competence in a particular domain, the more he 
becomes able to recall and use the automatic part of his knowledge. This implies that accessibility has 
different levels and that some operations demand more mental effort than others.  
 
 
“The acquisition of skill selectively increases the accessibility of useful responses 
and of productive ways to organize information. The master chess player does not see the 
same board as the novice, and the skill of visualizing the tower that could be built from an 
array of blocks could surely be improved by prolonged practice.” (Kahneman Nobel 
Lecture) 
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The concept of accessibility is related to the notions of stimulus salience, selective attention, and 
response activation or priming. Following Kahneman again 
 
“Physical salience also determines accessibility: if a large green letter and a small 
blue letter are shown at the same time, ‘green’ will come to mind first. However, salience 
can be overcome by deliberate attention: an instruction to look for the smaller letter will 
enhance the accessibility of all its features. “(Ibid.) 
 
In parallel with the two types of cognitive processes, psychologists define two types of memorization. 
On the one hand there is ‘procedural memory’, which is automatic, unconscious or non-conscious and 
is reflected in our actions. Well known examples of the use of procedural knowledge are driving a car 
and acquiring grammatical competence: in grammar acquisition, in fact, using plurals and the past tense 
in accordance with grammatical rules is automatic. The same happens in the repeated playing of games, 
where routinization leads to procedural knowledge (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994).  
On the other hand, there is ‘declarative memory’. Declarative knowledge is effortful and open to 
conscious inspection, and it requires symbols. The most evident examples are mathematical operations 
and symbolization.  
The distinction between explicit/controlled and automatic/unconscious mental processes has a parallel 
in the distinction between the ‘constructivist’ and ‘ecological’ orders suggested and analyzed by 
Vernon Smith. The former order, the ‘constructivist’ one, is related to declarative, controlled processes, 
while the latter refers to automatic processes. There is an obvious relationship between this view and 
Hayek’s idea of institutions as an order not generated by intentional design. I refer to Vernon Smith’s 
Nobel Lecture, which shows in masterly manner how markets and other economic institutions are 
pervaded by the interaction between constructivist and ecological rationality. (Vernon Smith, 2002). 
The distinction between the two cognitive systems helps us move toward a new, more complex 
explanation of systematic deviations from pure rationality. Without describing all the consequences of 
this new view, here I merely point out that recent evidence from the neural sciences further emphasizes 
the importance of emotional processes.(Camerer et al., 2004 forthcoming) 
 
The discussion in the previous sections relates to the limits of rationality due to constraints in System2, 
the controlled process of reasoning (based on symbolic manipulations). The processes of editing and 
building a representation of a problem are seemingly related to the threshold between the two systems, 
and to the dynamic of interaction between them. In fact, on the one hand we have the ”routinization” of 
thought; on the other, the emergence or “elicitation” of unconsciously memorized items used as 
elementary building blocks in deliberate reasoning. A clear example is provided by chess.  
Chess grandmaster performances are based on ability to process and deliberately use more than 20,000 
chessboards stored in the procedural memory.  To some extent, these items can be considered the basic 
building blocks in representation of the game and discovery of a satisficing strategy. The difficulty of 
substituting some or all of these basic items with new ones can, as we have seen, explain the general 
suboptimality of strategy building. 
 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The economic methodology inherited from the Chicago school becomes untenable when formal 
demonstration is made that problem solving leads generally to sub-optimal stable solutions: the ‘as if’ 
justification of perfect rationality proves to be a fallacious metaphor; errors and violations of rationality 
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are recognized as systematic; and the limits of rational behaviors can no longer be defended with the 
idea of a process of selection of the best.  
With the waning of this approach, the cognitive characteristics of choice processes are regaining 
ground in the long-standing debate between psychological and normative view. Both the bounded 
rationality and the behavioral economics approach hold that the crucial aspect of the deliberate 
decision-making process is the ability to construct new representations of problems. The evolution of 
analytical tools and experimental outcomes is shifting the focus of attention from the 
coherence/incoherence of choices to the representation and editing of problems. The distinction 
between two types of cognitive processes – the effortful process of deliberate reasoning on the one 
hand, and the automatic process of unconscious intuition on the other – can provide a different map 
with which to explain a broad class of deviations from pure ‘olympian’ rationality.  
 How human actions arise as the joint effect of these two cognitive processes, how institutions function 
as the joint effect of tacit and explicit knowledge, are becoming crucial issues for decision theory; 
issues whose examination will yield better understanding of human rationality.  
Such analysis requires establishing an inextricable connection between psychology and economics: a 
demanding and important task which raises questions concerning one of the fundamental statutes of the 
neoclassical construction of economic theory: Lionel Robbins’ idea that economy is a normative 
science whose tenet is the logic of means and ends.   
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